
By Nige Wilkinson, COO, Cyberfort
Somewhere in the last five years, cybersecurity stopped being a technical problem and became an admin problem. Ask a CISO what keeps them up at night and, increasingly, the answer isn’t a novel piece of malware or a nation-state actor – it’s the sheer weight of paperwork now required to prove they’re prepared for one.
NIS2, DORA, GDPR, the UK’s incoming Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, ISO 27001, SOC 2, sector-specific overlays for finance, health and critical infrastructure – the list doesn’t just grow, it multiplies, and rarely in ways that line up neatly with each other.
The uncomfortable question is whether all of this is actually making anyone safer, or whether it’s simply making them better at demonstrating, on paper, that they tried.
An alphabet soup nobody can finish
The regulatory picture facing a mid-sized UK or European business today is genuinely difficult to hold in your head all at once. A financial services firm operating across borders might need to satisfy DORA’s operational resilience testing regime, NIS2’s incident reporting timelines, GDPR’s breach notification rules, and whatever the UK’s own Cyber Security and Resilience Bill eventually demands once it clears Parliament – [1]the Bill has now passed through the Commons and is before the House of Lords, with reports of penalties of up to £100,000 a day for organisations that fail to act on relevant threats. This isn’t a UK problem alone. The World Economic Forum’s Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026 found that regulatory compliance and governance complexity is now cited as a significant challenge by 41% of organisations globally. More strikingly, the report notes that as regulatory environments mature, they don’t necessarily get simpler – different regions are advancing at different speeds with different priorities, leaving multinational organisations reconciling a patchwork of obligations that sometimes contradict each other. Only 30% of respondents in Europe and 29% in North America believe their regulatory environment is actually effective, despite – or perhaps because of – how comprehensive it has become.
That’s a startling admission. The people closest to this regulation, tasked with implementing it, largely don’t believe it’s working as intended.
Ticking boxes while the threat moves on
None of this is an argument against regulation itself. Left entirely to their own devices, plenty of organisations would under-invest in security until a breach forced their hand, and the data backs that up. The UK government’s own [2]Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025/2026 found that only 25% of businesses have a formal incident response plan.
Fewer than one in six review the cyber risk posed by their immediate suppliers, and just 6% look further down the supply chain. Regulation exists precisely because voluntary good practice has a patchy track record.
The problem is what happens when compliance becomes the finish line rather than the starting point. A framework audit tells you whether policies exist, boxes have been ticked, or the paperwork trail is in order on the day of assessment. It tells you far less about whether an organisation could actually detect, contain and recover from a live ransomware attack at 2am on a bank holiday weekend.
Attackers don’t check whether their target passed its last ISO 27001 audit before they act and the frequency with which they’re acting is rising sharply. The National Cyber Security Centre’s Annual Review recorded 204 “nationally significant” incidents in the past year, more than double the 89 recorded the year before – an average of four serious incidents a week hitting the UK alone.
Compliance, in other words, is necessary but not sufficient. Treating it as the whole job is where things go wrong.
The board still isn’t in the room
Part of the reason compliance so often eclipses resilience is where responsibility sits within organisations. The same UK breaches survey found board-level ownership of cyber security now sits at 31% of businesses – an improvement on the previous year’s 27% but still meaning that in roughly two-thirds of UK organisations, nobody at board level is formally accountable for it.
Among smaller businesses, that gap is even wider than the headline figure suggests, with large organisations (68%) far more likely to have board engagement than smaller ones.
When cyber security is delegated entirely downward, it tends to get reframed in the language the delegated team already speaks fluently: audits, certifications, regulatory deadlines.
Resilience, by contrast, is a strategic and cultural question – how quickly can the business make decisions under pressure, how well do teams outside IT understand their role in an incident, how resilient are third-party relationships and strategic questions need a seat at the board table to get proper attention and budget. Without that, “are we compliant?” quietly becomes the only question anyone thinks to ask.
What genuine resilience actually looks like
Genuine cyber resilience isn’t a certificate. It’s the capacity to absorb an attack and keep functioning – to detect an intrusion quickly, contain it before it spreads, communicate clearly with customers and regulators, and restore operations without the business grinding to a halt.
That requires investment in things that don’t always map neatly onto a compliance checklist: incident response rehearsal, cross-functional crisis planning, honest testing of assumptions, and a culture where staff report suspicious activity rather than quietly hoping it isn’t their problem.
Regulation can support that culture, but it can’t manufacture it. A business can hold every certification going and still fold within hours of a serious attack if nobody has actually rehearsed what happens next.
Regulation isn’t the enemy…complacency is
The honest answer to whether regulation has become too complex is, yes, in places, and that complexity carries a real cost in time, money and attention that smaller organisations in particular can ill afford. But the more useful question for any business leader isn’t whether there are too many frameworks to follow. It’s whether their organisation would still function if the regulator, for once, wasn’t watching.
Regulation sets the standard. It was never meant to be the ceiling. The organisations that will weather the next serious incident well are not necessarily the ones with the thickest compliance binder, they’re the ones that treated compliance as the beginning of the conversation about resilience, rather than the end of it